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I.

INTRODUCTION

The majority of cocaine illegally smuggled into the United
States travels over maritime routes, whether by sea or by air, for
at least a portion of its journey. These maritime routes, known
collectively as the "transit zone," comprise a six-million square
mile area including the Caribbean Sea, the Gulf of Mexico, and
the Eastern Pacific.' In 1997, an estimated 430 metric tons of
cocaine, 30 metric tons of heroin, and a large amount of
marijuana were smuggled to the United States via the transit
zone.' Similarly, thousands of immigrants attempting to illegally
enter the United States, either on their own or with assistance
from professional smugglers, travel via the transit zone.3
Smugglers continually frustrate U.S. law enforcement efforts by
transiting through the foreign territorial seas and air space of
coastal states along the transit zone and by using foreign-flagged
ships to carry their illicit cargo.'
International law prohibits U.S. law enforcement authorities
such as the U.S. Coast Guard from entering foreign territorial
sea or air space, or from boarding a foreign flagged vessel, unless
the United States first obtains the permission of the foreign

1. See James D. Hull & Michael D. Emerson, High "Seize" Maritime Interdiction
Works!, U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, Jan. 1999 at 64-65.

2. See id.
3. See id. at 64.

4. See id. at 65.
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state.' However, the process of obtaining permission is often a
time consuming, and sometimes futile task. Moreover, Latin
American and Caribbean nations closely guard their sovereignty,
especially against the United States, and some nations simply
refuse to cooperate with United States counter-drug law
enforcement efforts.'
During the past five years, however, the United States has
entered into a series of bilateral maritime agreements with
twenty-nine Latin American and Caribbean States for the
purpose of combating illicit drug and immigrant smuggling in the
transit zone.7 Bilateral maritime agreements streamline the
process involved in obtaining permission from a foreign State to
enter their territorial sea and air space or to board one of their
Additionally, bilateral maritime
ships on the high seas.8
agreements support the goals of the 1988 United Nations
Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances and the United Nations Law of the Sea
Convention that requires States to cooperate in suppressing
illicit traffic by sea.9
5. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec.
10, 1982, U.N. Doc A/CONF.62/122 (1982) (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994), Part V, 21
I.L.M. 1261 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. Article 2 specifically states:
1. The sovereignty of a coastal State extends, beyond its land territory and
internal waters and, in the case of an archipelagic State, its archipelagic
waters, to an adjacent belt of sea, described as the territorial sea. 2. This
sovereignty extends to the air space over the territorial sea as well as its bed
and subsoil. 3. The sovereignty over the territorial sea is exercised subject to
this Convention and to other rules of international law.
UNCLOS, art. 2, 21 I.L.M. at 1272.
6. See IVELAW L. GRIFFITH, DRUGS AND SECURITY IN THE CARIBBEAN 20-21 (1997);
Ivelaw L. Griffith, The Geographyof Drug Trafficking in the Caribbean,in FROM PIRATES
TO DRUG LORDS THE POST COLD-WAR CARIBBEAN SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 106 (Michael
C. Desch, et. al. eds., 1998).
7. See Maritime Counter-drug and AMIO Agreement Chart, U.S. Coast Guard,
COMDT (G-OPL-L), Jan. 12, 1999 update, contained herein as Appendix A, [hereinafter
Bi-lateral Agreement Chart].
8. See Interview with Lt. Donald Brown, Senior Watch Stander at the Coast Guard
Seventh District Command Center, in Miami, Fla. (Jan. 15, 1998).
9. See United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances, opened for signature Dec. 20, 1988, art. 17, U.N. Doc
E/CONF.82/15 (1989), 28 I.L.M. 497, 518 (requiring parties to cooperate to the fullest
extent possible to suppress illicit traffic by sea in conformity with the international law of
the sea, and to enter into bilateral or regional agreements to facilitate or enhance
cooperation described by Article 17). See also Article 18 of UNCLOS, supra note 5, 21
I.L.M. at 1273, which states:
1. All States shall cooperate in the suppression of illicit traffic in narcotic
drugs and psychotropic substances engaged in by ships on the high seas
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The U.S. Coast Guard" is the lead U.S. government agency
charged with enforcing maritime law on the high seas and in all
maritime areas subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.1
Bilateral maritime agreements effectively enhance the U.S.
Coast Guard's already broad law enforcement powers by
providing authority and procedures for law enforcement
operations when the U.S. Coast Guard has reasonable suspicion
that a vessel or aircraft is breaking the law. Each bilateral
maritime agreement delineates the specific authority granted to
the U.S. Coast Guard by the foreign State and provides specific
procedures for implementing and utilizing this authority.
Of the twenty-nine Latin American and Caribbean States
that have entered into bilateral maritime agreements with the
United States, each nation has elected to adopt some, but usually
not all, of the provisions of the six-part model maritime
agreement."2 Thus, the U.S. Coast Guard may have standing
authority to enter into one nation's territorial sea to investigate a
vessel suspected of smuggling but not the territorial sea of an
adjacent nation. Such jurisdictional inconsistencies have created
a patchwork quilt of authority, including some notably large
gaps, for the U.S. Coast Guard and other U.S. law enforcement
agencies to operate within. Yet, bilateral maritime agreements
have provided the U.S. Coast Guard with more flexibility then
ever before to combat maritime smuggling.
This Comment will discuss the pertinent historical
background of illicit trafficking in the Caribbean and explore the
use of bilateral maritime agreements as a solution to interdicting
maritime smugglers. Part II of this Comment will examine the
U.S. Coast Guard's role in maritime interdiction and analyze the
U.S. government's six-part model maritime agreement. Part III
will analyze the current maritime interdiction authority provided
by international law. Part IV will examine the advantages that
contrary to international conventions.
2. Any state that has reasonable grounds for believing that a ship flying its

flag is engaged in illicit traffic in narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances
may request to cooperation of other States to suppress such traffic.

10. The U.S. Coast Guard has been in existence since 1790 when Congress created it
for the purpose of revenue collection. The service was originally named the U.S. Revenue

Cutter Service, and its purpose was to collect revenues from ships and enforce U.S.
customs laws. The U.S. Coast Guard has remained as the lead U.S. agency in maritime
law enforcement since 1790. See generally R. JOHNSON, GuARDIANS OF THE SEA (1987).
11. See 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) (1974).
12. See Bi-lateral Agreement Chart, supra note 7.
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bilateral maritime agreements provide. Part V will analyze
several of the complex legal issues posed by bilateral maritime
agreements. Part VI will analyze whether pursuing adoption of a
regional multilateral maritime agreement would be more
preferable, or whether the existing framework of bilateral
maritime agreements should be expanded and improved upon.
Finally, this Comment concludes that bilateral maritime
agreements are the most pragmatic approach to combating illicit
maritime smuggling, and that the ultimate solution of signing a
regional multilateral maritime agreement will only become
feasible by continued expansion of the existing framework of
bilateral maritime agreements.
II. THE LAW OF THE SEA, U.S. COAST GUARD AUTHORITY,
AND THE U.S. SIX-PART MODEL MARITIME AGREEMENT
A.

The UnitedNations Convention on the Law of
the Sea and TraditionalMaritime Interdiction
Authority and Procedure

The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS)" established a comprehensive regime for governing
control of ocean space.14 The treaty's definitions of territorial
seas and high seas, and the control that sovereign states may
exercise over vessels located in these respective parts, are vital
background concepts to understanding this Comment.
Articles 2 and 3 of UNCLOS allow every coastal State to
extend its sovereignty from its land territory out over the sea and
airspace surrounding it to a limit not exceeding twelve nautical
miles. 1 This space is commonly known as a State's territorial sea
and airspace. A State may enforce its domestic laws and exercise
control over its own vessels and aircraft and any other State's
vessels and aircraft that come within its territorial sea or
13. UNCLOS, supra note 5.

14. See Bernardo Zuleta, Under-Secretary General, Introduction to THE LAW OF THE
SEA: OFFICIAL TEXT OF THE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, xix, U.N. Sales
No. E.83.V.5 (1983).
15. See UNCLOS, supra note 5, arts. 2 & 3, 21 I.L.M. at 1272. "Every State has the

right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical
miles, measured from baselines determined in accordance with this Convention." Id. art.
3, 21 I.L.M. at 1272.
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airspace with some limited exceptions. 6 This provides the states
with the ability to protect, regulate, and control activities that
take place close to their land borders.
The area extending beyond the outer limit of the territorial
sea is known as the high seas. 7 UNCLOS preserves freedom
over the high seas in Article 89, which states that no State may
subject any part of the high seas to its sovereignty." Moreover,
UNCLOS provides, in Article 90, that all States have the right to
sail ships on the high seas. 9 Thus, unlike a State's territorial
seas and airspace, a State is prohibited from exerting control
over the vessels of another State on the high seas.
The nationality, or flag of registry, of ships is also a crucial
component of UNCLOS." Every State is allowed to register ships
in its territory and grant them the right to fly their flag.2 A ship
can only be registered in one State, and it may not change its
registration mid-voyage or during a port of call unless ownership

16. See UNCLOS, supra note 5, art. 17, 21 I.L.M. at 1273 (providing for "the right of
innocent passage through the territorial sea"), art. 18, 21 I.L.M. at 1273 (defining passage
as "navigation through the territorial sea for the purpose of. (a) traversing that sea
without entering internal waters or calling at a roadstead or port facility outside internal
waters; or (b) proceeding to or from internal waters or a call at such roadstead or port
facility").
17. See UNCLOS, supra note 5, art. 86, 21 I.L.M. at 1286; Convention on the High
Seas, art. 1, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5520, 450 U.N.T.S. 82.
18. See UNCLOS, supra note 5, art. 89, 21 I.L.M. at 1287. It should be noted that
Part V of UNCLOS, concerning the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), provides an exception
to article 89. See id. arts. 55-57, 21 I.L.M. at 1257. The EEZ is the area beyond and
adjacent to the territorial sea, normally extending out to 200 miles, in which the coastal
state retains the sovereign right to explore, exploit and conserve natural resources such
as fisheries stocks and mineral deposits. For example, the United States can make and
enforce fisheries regulations out to 200 nautical miles from its coast. However, the
United States could not subject foreign vessels found in its EEZ to its jurisdiction for any
other reason other than natural resources violations. Thus, for the purposes of this
Comment's discussion concerning illegal trafficking of narcotics and immigrants, the EEZ
is essentially the same as the high seas.
19. See id. art. 90, 21 I.L.M. at 1287 ("Every State, whether coastal or landlocked,
has the right to sail ships flying its flag on the high seas.").
20. See id. art. 91, 21 I.L.M. at 1287.
1. Every State shall fix the conditions for the grant of its nationality to ships,
for the registration of ships in its territory, and for the right to fly its flag.
Ships have the nationality of a State whose flag they are entitled to fly. There
must exist a genuine link between the State and the ship.
2. Every State shall issue to ships to which it has granted the right to fly its
flag documents to that effect.
Id.
21. See id.
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of the vessel has been transferred.22 The State under which a
vessel is registered is commonly known as the vessel's flagState.23 If a ship claims to be registered under more than one
State, it will be assimilated as having no nationality." This is
commonly referred to as a "stateless" vessel.2 All nations may
exert jurisdiction over a stateless vessel because these vessels are
not protected by the flag of any sovereign State. 6
A State has exclusive jurisdiction over vessels flying its flag27
and therefore may always exert jurisdiction over these vessels28
except when they located within another sovereign State's
territorial sea.29 A State does not have jurisdiction over foreign
vessels 0 except when they are located within the State's own
territorial sea.31
One of the main purposes of bilateral maritime agreements
is to prevent vessels and aircraft engaged in illegal activity from
transiting through the territorial seas of various coastal States to
2
escape interdiction by law enforcement authorities."
Bilateral
maritime agreements provide standing authority for law
enforcement authorities to pursue and interdict illicit traffickers
in and through other coastal State's territorial seas and airspace.
Without a bilateral agreement, U.S. law enforcement
platforms such as a U.S. Coast Guard Cutter33 or aircraft would
normally be prohibited from entering the territorial sea or
22. See id. art. 92, 21 I.L.M. at 1287.
23. See id. art. 94, 21 I.L.M. at 1287.
24. See id. art. 92, 21 I.L.M. at 1287.
25. See United States v. Cortes, 588 F.2d 106, 107 (5th Cir. 1979).
26. See Convention on the High Seas, art. 6, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5520, 450
U.N.T.S. 82. See also United States v. Cortes, 588 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that a
stateless vessel can be stopped by any warship because stateless vessels do not have the
protection provided by a flag state); United States v. Dominguez, 604 F.2d 304, 308 (4th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1014 (1980) (stating that international law shelters only
members of the international community of nations from unlawful boardings and
searches on the high seas).
27. See UNCLOS, supra note 5, art. 92, 21 I.L.M. at 1287.
28. See id. arts. 2 & 92, 21 I.L.M. at 1272, 1287.
29. See id. art. 2, 21 I.L.M. at 1272.
30. See id. arts. 89 & 92, 21 I.L.M. at 1287.
31. See id. art. 2, 21 I.L.M. at 1272.
32. See Anthony T. Bryan, The State of the Region, Trends Affecting the Future of
CaribbeanSecurity, in FROM PIRATES TO DRUG LORDS THE POST-COLD WAR CARIBBEAN
SECURIrY ENVIRONMENT 45 (Michael C. Desch, et al. eds., 1998).
33. A "Cutter" is the term used to refer to U.S. Coast Guard law enforcement vessel.
The hull of a Cutter is painted white and it has a distinctive international orange and
blue slash painted on the bow.
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airspace of another nation or from boarding its vessels on the
high seas. 4 UNCLOS states that the sovereignty of a coastal
State extends to both its territorial sea and airspace over its
territorial sea. 3 As previously discussed, Article 3 of UNCLOS
provides that every nation can claim a territorial sea out to
twelve nautical miles. 6 Additionally, the United States cannot
normally exert jurisdiction over a foreign flagged vessel on the
high seas.
Normally, the flag-State has exclusive jurisdiction over
vessels flying its flag.38 Moreover, articles 87 and 89 of UNCLOS
provide that the high seas are open to all states thereby
preserving freedom of navigation on the high seas.' Therefore, a
U.S. Coast Guard Cutter cannot board a foreign flagged vessel on
the high seas without the consent of the vessel's flag-State.
Essentially, a foreign flagged vessel sailing on the high seas is
analogous to a portion of that country floating on the high seas; it
possesses all the rights of that sovereign State.
B. U.S. Coast Guard Authority and Background
The U.S. Coast Guard is the leading U.S. maritime law
enforcement agency and its mission is to "enforce or assist in the
enforcement of all applicable laws on, under and over the high

34. See UNCLOS, supra note 5, art. 2, 21 I.L.M. at 1272. However, ships of all
States are entitled to the right of innocent passage, which is essentially the right to
transit through another State's territorial sea without being harassed. See id. art. 17, 21
IL.M. at 1273. This right terminates when passage no longer becomes innocent, for
instance when a vessel is engaged in illicit activity that violates the domestic law of the
coastal State. Additionally, a foreign warship is proscribed from conducting law
enforcement operations within another nations territorial sea because if they do so, then
by definition their passage is no longer innocent. Thus, while a U.S. Coast Guard Cutter
is permitted to transit through another State's territorial sea, it cannot conduct law
enforcement operations. It should also be noted that it is the practice of most Navies to
request clearance from a foreign State for their warships to enter their territorial sea to
clarify that no hostile intentions are present.
35. See id. art. 2, 21 1.L.M. at 1272.
36. See id. art. 3, 21 I.L.M. at 1273.
37. See id. art. 89, 21 I.L.M. at 1287.
38. See id. art. 92, 21 I.L.M. at 1287.
39. "The high seas are open to all States, whether coastal or land-locked. Freedom
of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by this Convention and by
other rules of international law. It comprises, inter alia, both for coastal and land locked
States.. .. " Id. art. 87, 21 I.L.M. at 1286. "No State may validly purport to subject any
part of the high seas to its sovereignty." Id. art. 89, 21 I.L.M. at 1287.
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seas and waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States." °
The Coast Guard also has authority to enforce U.S. law in waters
subject to U.S. jurisdiction, and in international waters on
vessels subject to U.S. jurisdiction.4' If valid permission from the
flag-State exists, as bilateral maritime agreements sometimes
provide, the Coast Guard has authority to stop, search and seize
a foreign vessel on the high seas if there is a reasonable suspicion
of violation of U.S. law.42
The U.S. Coast Guard's counter-narcotics mission originated
in the early 1970s when the U.S. consumption of marijuana
exceeded the production capability of domestic growers, and
Latin America became the chief supplier of marijuana to the
United States." From 1973 to 1977, the Coast Guard seized 74
vessels, 1.2 million pounds of marijuana, and arrested 447 people
in the Caribbean." Most of these vessels and persons, however,
were of U.S. nationality. 5 In the early 1980s, these amateur
smugglers were replaced by professional criminal organizations
from the United States and Latin America.46 These organizations
recognized the U.S. Coast Guard's legal difficulties in stopping
foreign registered vessels on foreign territorial seas. 7 By lying
about the nationality of their vessels, smugglers were able to
stall proper identification of their vessels and thus confuse the
diplomatic procedures necessary to obtain permission to board a
foreign flagged vessel."8 Moreover, such delays allowed the

40.

14 U.S.C. § 2 (1999).

41. See 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) (1974). This statute gives the U.S. Coast Guard near
plenary power to make warantless stops of vessels at sea. See G. Shelton, The U.S. Coast
Guard's Law Enforcement Authority Under 14 U.S.C. 89: Smuggler's Blues or Boater's
Nightmare, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 933 (1993).
42. See U.S. v. Cortes, 588 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1979); U.S. v. May, 470 F. Supp 384
(C.D. Tex. 1979). See also The Maritime Drug law Enforcement Act, 46 U.S.C. App. 1901
et seq. (providing for the enforcement of U.S. counter-narcotics law where the flag-State
consents).
43. See generally C. M. FuSS, JR., SEA OF GRASS, THE MARITIME DRUG WAR 19701990 (1996).
44. See Andrew W. Anderson, In the Wake of the DAUNTLESS: The Background
and Development of Maritime Interdictions Operations, in THE LAW OF THE SEA: WHAT
LIES AHEAD, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 20TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE LAW OF THE SEA

at 15 (Thomas A. Clingan, Jr. ed. 1986).
Fuss, supra note 43, at 10.
Anderson, supra note 44.
id.
id. at 17.

INSTITUTE JULY 21-24,

45.
46.
47.
48.

See
See
See
See
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smugglers to jettison their cargoes, destroy evidence, and
ultimately avoid prosecution. 9
Additionally, the early 1980s saw the rise of cocaine as the
drug of choice for affluent Americans." Cultivation of the cocoa
plant was introduced into the jungle regions of Columbia during
this time to support the increasing U.S. demand for cocaine."
The cocaine trade proved to be not only highly profitable, but also
easier to conceal than marijuana. Today, smugglers often use
hidden compartments on small freighters to bring cocaine into
the United States.52 However, entry into the United States is
often the final leg of a multi-leg journey. Cocaine coming from
Latin America is often grown in Peru or Bolivia, processed in
Columbia, and shipped north in small high speed boats (known
as "go fasts"), or "air-dropped" by small planes in Puerto Rico, the
Dominican Republic, Haiti, and nations in the Leeward Islands. 3
These multi-ton loads are then broken down into smaller loads
and shipped through the transit zone on small noncommercial
vessels such as coastal freighters, fishing vessels, and go fasts.54
Currently, this type of smuggling accounts for sixty to seventy
percent of the total flow through the transit zone. 5
Almost all cocaine bound for the United States travels over
maritime routes for a portion of its journey and the U.S.
government's job of interdiction has become much more
complex." Smugglers constantly take advantage of transit zone
geography for both the practical and the legal advantages it
provides in avoiding detection. In 1997, the U.S. Coast Guard
seized or assisted in seizing 103,617 pounds of cocaine and
102,000 pounds of marijuana.57

49. See id. at 18.
50. See id. at 22.
51. See id.
52. See Interview with Lt. Donald Brown, supra note 8.
53. Most of the world's cocaine supply is produced in South America, coming from
Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, and Venezuela. Columbia alone processes 80%
of all the cocaine in the world, though only 20% is actually cultivated there. See
GRIFFITH, supranote 6, at 55.
54. See Interview with Lt. Donald Brown, supra note 8.
55. See Hull & Emerson, supranote 1, at 65.
56. See id.
57. See U.S. Coast Guard Drug Interdiction Report, Current Reports, Coast Guard
Office of Law Enforcement (visited Feb. 24, 2000) <http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-o/gopl/mle/drugs.htm>.
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The U.S. Coast Guard is also the lead U.S. government
agency for the maritime interdiction of illegal immigrants."5 Two
provisions of the Immigration and Naturalization Act5 9 provide
authority for interdicting and excluding immigrants found
attempting to enter the United States illegally. Section 1182(f)
grants the President authority to suspend the entry of any group60
of aliens that he deems detrimental to the United States.
Section 1185 makes it unlawful for any alien to enter the United
States unless they do so in compliance with the rules set by the
President.6 1 The U.S. Coast Guard has authority to enforce both
these provisions, as they are U.S. law.62
The idea of preserving absolute freedom of the seas has great
merit. It would certainly be simpler and less expensive for the
U.S. Coast Guard to patrol the U.S. coast out to twelve nautical
miles and wait to take enforcement action until vessels enter the
U.S. territorial sea. However, this has proven ineffective for
various reasons. First, the Coast Guard does not have enough
time to stop smugglers before they reach the shore. Second, the
U.S. coastline is simply too large to patrol and defend; Florida
alone has 8,400 miles of shoreline. 4 The United States must also
protect the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and its Caribbean
Third, foreign
territories such as the U.S. Virgin Islands.
territorial boundaries prohibit the U.S. Coast Guard from
interdicting illicit traffickers along the majority of their transit to
the United States even when their presence has been detected
58. See 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) (1974).
59. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(f) & 1185 (1999).
60. "Whenever the President finds that the entry of aliens or of any class of aliens
into the United States would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, he
may... suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens as immigrants or
nonimmigrant, .. . he may deem to be appropriate." 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) (1999).
61. "Unless otherwise ordered by the President, it shall be unlawful- (1) for any
alien to ... attempt to... enter the United States except under such reasonable rules,
regulations, and orders, and subject to such limitations and exceptions as the President
may prescribe;..." 8 U.S.C. § 1185(a) (1999).
62. See 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) (1974). The Coast Guard may also act pursuant to its duty
to render assistance to distressed persons when migrants interdicted at sea are found to
be in poor health from exposure, dehydration, or otherwise. See 14 U.S.C. § 2 (1999);
International Convention on Search and Rescue, opened for signature Apr. 27, 1979,
(entered into force June 22, 1985) reprinted in 1 INTERNATIONAL AND UNITED STATES
DOCUMENTS ON OCEANS LAW AND POLICY, El (John Norton Moore ed, 1986);
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, opened for signature Nov. 1, 1974,
32 U.S.T. 47, T.I.A.S. No. 9700 (entered into force May 25, 1980).
63. See Hull & Emerson, supra note 1, at 65.
64. See Fuss, supra note 43, at 11.
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via radar or other means. A smuggler departing the La Guajira
peninsula in Colombia bound for the United States can transit up
along the Central American and Mexican Coast and thereby
remain within the territorial seas of the various coastal States
that border this route for almost two-thirds of the journey."
Similarly, a vessel departing Hispaniola can transit up the Old
Bahama Channel staying entirely within Cuban or Bahamian
territorial seas until it is just fifty to ninety miles off the Florida
coast.6"
Aircraft transporting illegal drugs can also take
advantage of Cuban, Bahamian, and other foreign airspace.67
Conversely, U.S. Coast Guard Cutters and aircraft are not
permitted to patrol within or fly over foreign territorial seas
without permission. 6
A large exception to the requirement of having to obtain the
permission of the flag-State to board one of its vessels is a
consensual boarding. The master of a foreign flagged ship can
verbally consent to the U.S. Coast Guard boarding his or her
vessel.6" However, the scope of the boarding is limited to the
master's consent. For example, the master of a Panamanian
freighter may consent to the U.S. Coast Guard boarding the
vessel but only for the purpose of verifying the ship's
documentation. The master may withdraw consent at any time
and ask the boarding team to disembark. A U.S. Coast Guard
request to conduct a consensual boarding is almost never
refused.7" In fact, refusal
is so infrequent, that it is considered in
71
and of itself suspicious.

If during a consensual boarding the U.S. Coast Guard
discovers evidence of illicit activity or develops reasonable
suspicion that a vessel may be engaged in illicit activity, they

65. See Interview with Lt. Donald Brown, supra note 8.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See U.S. Coast Guard Memorandum from R.R. Beardsworth, United States
Coast Guard, on Boardings Pursuant to Bilateral Maritime Agreements (Sept. 26 1996)
(copy on file with author).
70. See Anderson, supra note 44, at 32.
71. See id. It should be noted that the U.S. Coast Guard must be extremely careful
not to use refusal to conduct a consensual boarding as leverage for probable cause.
Otherwise, it could risk losing its authority under 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) to stop, board and
search vessels without probable cause or a warrant.
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must request additional guidance from their operational chain of
command."
C. The U.S. Government's Six Part Model
Maritime Agreement
The Six Part U.S. Model Maritime Agreement, reprinted in
Appendix B, is designed to provide standing authority and
procedures for the U.S. Coast Guard to take action against illicit
traffickers.73 The six parts are: (1) shipboarding, (2) entry-toinvestigate, (3) overflight, (4) shipriders, (5) pursuit, and (6)
order-to-land.
Normally, a foreign flagged vessel on the high seas is subject
to the exclusive jurisdiction of its flag-State." "Shipboarding"
allows the U.S. Coast Guard to stop, board, and search foreign
flagged vessels without the flag-State's permission when those
vessels are located on the high seas and are suspected of illicit
traffic.75
With the exception of innocent passage, the U.S. Coast
Guard is not permitted to enter foreign territorial sea or airspace
without first obtaining permission." Therefore, the second model
maritime agreement provision, "entry-to-investigate," allows the
U.S. Coast Guard to enter foreign territorial waters or airspace
72. See Interview with Lt. Donald Brown, supra note 8. Normally, this procedure
involves the Cutter's operational commander requesting authority to continue the
boarding from the Office of the Commandant at the Coast Guard Headquarters in
Washington D.C. Officials at Coast Guard headquarters then convene a Presidential
Directive 27 process, which is essentially an internal U.S. government interagency
conference where officials from the Department of Justice, the Department of
Immigration and Naturalization, the Department of State, the Coast Guard, and any
other concerned federal agencies keep each other informed of ongoing events and
determine a unified course of action. If the panel concludes that a boarding request has
sufficient merit, the State Department will contact the flag-State and request permission
to continue the boarding. Permission to enforce U.S. law or the flag-State's domestic law
may also be requested. Occasionally, the flag-State will choose to bring in its own law
enforcement officials or have the vessel brought to one of its ports. See FUSS, supra note
43, at 33.
73. U.S. Coast Guard officers are vital members of the multi-agency U.S. delegation
responsible for negotiating bilateral maritime counter-drug and migrant agreements.
74. See UNCLOS, supra note 5, art. 92, 21 I.L.M. at 1287.
75. Of the twenty-nine nations with which the U.S. has bilateral agreements,
fourteen have agreed to the shipboarding provision. See Bi-lateral Agreement Chart,
supra note 7.
76. See supra notes 33-37, and accompanying text.
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to investigate vessels or aircraft located therein that are
suspected of illegal activities.77 Ideally, this will include the
authority to stop, board, and pursue such vessels.
"Overflight," the third model maritime agreement provision,
allows the U.S. Coast Guard aircraft to fly in foreign airspace
when in support of counter-smuggling operations. 8 Whether
foreign airspace includes the airspace over land or only the
airspace over maritime areas depends on the particular
agreement. "Overflight" differs from "entry-to-investigate" in
that it serves as a license to patrol foreign airspace in search of
illicit activity instead of only permitting entry into foreign
airspace in response to a report or sighting of a suspect vessel or
aircraft.79
"Shipriders," the fourth model maritime agreement
provision, is a standing arrangement pursuant to which a law
enforcement officer of one State is embarked onboard a law
enforcement plane or ship of another State."0 Once embarked,
the "shiprider" can authorize certain law enforcement actions
with respect to his nation's territorial sea or vessels sailing under
his country's flag which the foreign State's law enforcement
authorities could not take on their own.81
77. Twelve of the twenty-nine nations with which the U.S. has bilateral maritime
agreements have agreed to entry-to-investigate authority. See Bi-lateral Agreement
Chart, supra note 7. The right of "entry to investigate" is often used by U.S. Coast Guard
aircraft to investigate suspicious air radar tracks that correlate with a profile that is
consistent with aircraft engaged in illicit activity. For example, if a plane is detected on
radar coming off the North coast of South America, and there is no flight plan on file that
correlates with the planes radar track, the U.S. Coast Guard may take action to visually
identify the suspect aircraft. See Interview with Lt. Donald Brown, supra note 8. If the
aircraft continues on its northerly course over Haiti, the "entry-to-investigate" provision
of U.S.-Haiti bilateral maritime agreement will be implemented to provide U.S. Coast
Guard aircraft with authority to enter Haitian territorial airspace and conduct a visual
identification of the suspect aircraft.
78. Ten of the twenty-nine nations with which the U.S. has bilateral mariiime
agreements have agreed to "overflight" authority. See Bi-lateral Agreement Chart, supra
note 7.
79. Overflight authority is often used in areas notorious for high volumes of illicit
trafficking such as along the East coast of the Dominican Republic where immigrants
often attempt to cross the Mona Passage into Puerto Rico in small yolas (wooden canoes).
See Interview with Lt. Donald Brown, supra note 8.
80. Sixteen of the twenty-nine nations with which the U.S. maintains bilateral
agreements have agreed to the "shiprider" provision. See Bi-lateral Agreement Chart,
supra note 7. Most Latin American States commonly refer to their bilateral maritime
agreements with the United States as "Shiprider Agreements" no matter how many of the
six provisions they have chosen to adopt.
81. The use of shipriders is sometimes more attractive to nations that do not wish to
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"Pursuit," the fifth model maritime agreement provision,
allows the U.S. Coast Guard to pursue aircraft or vessels
suspected of illicit traffic into foreign waters or airspace. A
different authority, article 111 of UNCLOS, allows a State to
pursue a foreign vessel beyond its territorial sea, but only out on
the high seas.82 This pursuit must cease when the foreign vessel
enters another State's territorial sea. "Pursuit," however, allows
the U.S. Coast Guard to continue a pursuit into foreign waters or
airspace. s3
"Order-to-land," the sixth element, allows U.S. Coast Guard
aircraft to order aircraft suspected of illicit traffic to land in the
host nation. 4
An "order-to-land" must be coordinated with
ground forces who can respond accordingly."
III. THE ADVANTAGE OF BILATERAL MARITIME AGREEMENTS

A. Reduction of Delays in the TraditionalBoarding

Process
Reducing the inherent delay in the traditional maritime

boarding process is one of the most compelling arguments for
having bilateral maritime agreements.86
With a bilateral
agreement in place, a U.S. Coast Guard Cutter can simply obtain
permission to implement the bilateral agreement and board a
vessel suspected of illicit trafficking. Even without reasonable
suspicion, a consensual boarding can be conducted. If during a
consensual boarding of limited scope the boarding team develops

grant the U.S. Coast Guard blanket consent to enter their territorial seas or board their
vessels on the high seas. The shiprider provides an additional element of control and
oversight of U.S. Coast Guard law enforcement actions. Moreover, it often provides
foreign vessels being boarded by the U.S. Coast Guard with a greater comfort factor when
they recognize that one of their own officers, and not just U.S. Coast Guard law
enforcement officials, are supervising the boarding.
82. See UNCLOS, supra note 5, art. 111, 21 I.L.M. at 1290.
83. Twelve of the twenty-nine nations with which the U.S. maintains bilateral
agreements have agreed to pursuit authority. See Bi-lateral Agreement Chart, supra note
7.
84. Seven of the twenty-nine nations with which the U.S. has bilateral agreements
with have agreed to order-to-land authority. See Bi-lateral Agreement Chart, supra note
7.
85. See Interview with Lt. Donald Brown, supra note 8.
86. See Hull & Emerson, supra note 1, at 66.
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a reasonable suspicion of illicit activity, they can request to
implement the bilateral agreement at that time.
The process of implementing the bilateral agreement is a
direct process conducted solely between the Cutter and its
operational commander. This is much more efficient than the
multi-level "Statement of No Objection" (SNO) process where
reasonable suspicion developed during a consensual boarding
must be relayed to the ship, then its operational commander, and
finally Coast Guard Headquarters. Implementing a bilateral
agreement is also much more efficient than the "Presidential
17
Directive 27" (PD-27) process which runs both horizontally
between the various interested U.S. government agencies, and
vertically between the State Department and the flag-State.
Bilateral maritime agreements also set forth the procedures
to be followed. This eliminates inconsistencies from the flagState granting permission to enforce U.S. law in one case but not
another.
Another important feature of bilateral maritime agreements
is the requirement of reasonable suspicion." The Coast Guard
must have reasonable suspicion that a vessel or aircraft is
engaged in illicit activity prior to implementing a bilateral
maritime agreement.8 9 If the U.S. Coast Guard continuously
implements the ship-boarding portion of a bilateral agreement
but fails to find any direct evidence of illicit activity, the flagState could conclude that the Coast Guard is abusing the
agreement and withdraw its authority. The fear of a flag-State
withdrawing from a bilateral agreement is in constant tension
with one of the greatest benefits that bilateral agreements
provide-increased boardings of foreign vessels under the
authority of bilateral maritime agreements. As long as the U.S.
Coast Guard truly has the requisite reasonable suspicion, the

87. See supra note 72.

88. Reasonable suspicion is the particularized and objective basis, supported by
specific and articulable facts, for suspecting that someone is engaged in criminal activity.
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
89. See Interview with Lt. Donald Brown, supra note 8. Presently, commanding
officers of Coast Guard Cutters have authority to make a determination of whether
reasonable suspicion exists. See U.S. Coast Guard Memorandum from Coast Guard

Commandant, 041328Z, on Boardings Pursuant to Bilateral Maritime Counter-Drug
Agreements (Mar. 1996) (copy on file with author).

2000]

BILATERAL MARITIME AGREEMENTS

agreement will be implemented thereby eliminating the
inefficiency of the SNO and PD-27 processes.
Thus, bilateral maritime agreements streamline the
boarding process by having the flag-State agree in advance with
the U.S. Coast Guard's judgment on whether reasonable
suspicion exists. Moreover, these agreements also provide U.S.
law enforcement the authority of the flag-State to further
investigate suspicions. While these shipboarding agreements
increase the speed with which a boarding can be initiated or
continued, they do not remove the obligation to contact the flagState once direct evidence of illegal activity is discovered. At this
point, the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter must notify its operational
commander, who will initiate the SNO process resulting in a PD27 process where the flag-State is contacted and asked for
disposition instructions. This means that if a flag-State has
agreed to shipboarding, boarding teams can quickly implement
the agreement to board the vessel; however, they may be a long
time disembarking if they discover direct evidence of illicit
activity.
B. DramaticReduction of Immigrants Interdicted
at Sea
In 1992, the U.S. Coast Guard interdicted 31,438 Haitian
immigrants attempting to enter the United States following the
In 1994, the Castro
overthrow of the Haitian Government.'
depart the island
to
voluntary
Cubans
government allowed
immigrants. 9' In
Cuban
37,191
of
interdiction
resulting in the
1995, the U.S. Coast Guard interdicted 4,047 Dominican
immigrants and, in 1996, another 5,430 Dominican immigrants
were interdicted in the Mona Passage while attempting to enter
the U.S. commonwealth of Puerto Rico.92
In 1997, however, the Coast Guard interdicted only 394
Cuban immigrants, 774 Haitian immigrants, and 1143
The implementation of bilateral
Dominican immigrants. 93
90. See U.S. Coast Guard, Alien Migrant Interdiction, Coast Guard Migrant
2000)
Interdictions, Calendar Year Chart 1982-Present (visited Jan. 25,
<http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-o/g-opl/mle/AMIO.htm>.
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. See id.
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maritime agreements was a main reason for the great reduction
in immigrants attempting to illegally enter the United States by
sea. While the only existing counter-migrant agreement the
United States has in place is with Cuba,94 migrant interdiction
procedures have been exercised with such great frequency with
Haiti and the Dominican Republic that the procedure has evolved
into a quasi-bilateral agreement." Once immigrants discover
that they will be swiftly returned to their county of origin, it
provides a great deterrent to others contemplating departure.
IV. COMPLEX ISSUES WITHIN BILATERAL MARITIME
AGREEMENTS
A.

Third Country Platform Boardings and Law
Enforcement Detachments

To take advantage of as many law enforcement platforms as
possible, the U.S. Coast Guard has formed law enforcement
detachments (LEDETs). LEDETs are small teams of Coast
Guard maritime law enforcement officers who sail aboard U.S.
Navy ships." The use of LEDETs has dramatically expanded the
U.S. law enforcement presence in the transit zone. Moreover, the
Coast Guard is able to take advantage of the U.S. Navy's
superior detection and monitoring capabilities to locate and
interdict illicit traffickers.
The Posse Comitatus Act directly proscribes the U.S. armed
forces from engaging in law enforcement activities. As a result,
the U.S. Navy does not have authority to directly engage in law
enforcement. However, by placing a U.S. Navy ship under the

94. See Interview with Lt. Donald Brown, supra note 8.
95. See id.
96. See U.S. Coast Guard, Tactical Law Enforcement Teams, (visited Jan. 26, 2000)
<http'/www.uscg.mil/lantarea/aofp/newpage4.htm?104,17>.
97. See 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1988) ("Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances
expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the
Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined
not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both."). This statute,
originally enacted in 1878, was premised on the intent of the Constitution's Framers
intense distrust of the military and their efforts to limit the military's role in civilian life
after their experience of being subjected to rule by British troops in the American
Colonies. See A. Abel, Not Fit For Sea Duty: The Posse Comitatus Act, The United States
Navy, and FederalLaw Enforcement at Sea, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 445, 448-49 (1990).
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temporary operational control of the Coast Guard LEDET, law
enforcement boardings can be conducted from the Navy ship.9"
This process is known as a Change in Operational Control or
"CHOPing.""9 When a U.S. Navy ship wants to conduct a law
enforcement boarding, it will advise its Navy operational
commander and the Coast Guard LEDET's operational
commander that it wishes to CHOP to the Coast Guard and
The embarked Coast
conduct a law enforcement boarding."
Guard LEDET officer will then temporarily assume operational
control of the Navy ship, and will order the Coast Guard's flag to
be flown from its mast.
Coast Guard LEDETs are also deployed on board Dutch or
British warships assigned to patrol off the coasts of their
possessions in the West Indies. These vessels are commonly
referred to as West Indies Guard Ships (WIGS).1"' Placing a
LEDET aboard a foreign naval vessel allows the naval vessel to
have authority of its flag-State as well as the jurisdictional
authority of the United States.' 2 Thus, a British WIG with an
embarked LEDET is able to board both British and U.S. ships on
the high seas.
Complex issues of international law arise, however, when a
U.S. Coast Guard LEDET embarked on a WIG boards a vessel
flagged in a third state and does so under the authority of a
bilateral maritime agreement between the United States and the
third state. For example, assume a Dutch WIG is patrolling off
the coast of Venezuela with an embarked U.S. Coast Guard
LEDET. If the LEDET sights a Venezuelan vessel it suspects of
illicit trafficking, is it appropriate to board the Venezuelan vessel
under the authority of the U.S-Venezuelan bilateral maritime
agreement?
Venezuela may not want its vessels stopped on the high seas
by Dutch warships for several reasons. First, Venezuela may
98. See U.S. Coast Guard, Tactical Law Enforcement Teams, supra note 96.
99. Interview with Lt. Donald Brown, supranote 8. See also Abel, supra note 97, at
483.
100. See Interview with Lt. Donald Brown, supra note 8.
101. See U.S. Coast Guard Memorandum from Commandant of Coast Guard,
272353Z, on LEDET Embarkation Aboard WIGS (May 1993) (copy on file with author).
102. See U.S. Coast Guard Memorandum from American Embassy in Caracas,
101753Z, on U.S.N.E. Maritime Counter-Drug Shipboarding Agreement-Protocol
Initialed Covering U.S. Coast Guard boardings from U.I., Dutch, and French Warships
(July 1997).
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have concerns with who would be liable for possible damage to
the Venezuelan vessel resulting from the boarding. Second,
Venezuela may not want its foreign nationals stopped and
possible detained on the high seas by Dutch WIGS. Finally,
Venezuela may be concerned with who is actually conducting the
stop and boarding-the U.S. LEDET or the Dutch Wig?
The simplest solution to the problem of third country
platform boardings is to address the issue within the terms of the
bilateral agreement itself. Often times clarifications can be made
to an existing agreement by means of a diplomatic note. For
example, a clarification to the 1991 U.S.-Venezuela counter-drug
shipboarding agreement was made on July 2, 1997, by a
diplomatic note in which Venezuela authorized U.S. LEDETs to
conduct boardings and searches of suspect Venezuelan vessels
from British, Dutch, and French government ships.'
However,
the Venezuelan government also made clear that it would refuse
future requests to exercise the U.S.-Venezuelan
agreement from
04
any country other than those mentioned.
Empowering LEDETs embarked on foreign naval vessels to
exercise U.S. bilateral maritime agreements with third states
pushes the limits of existing bilateral maritime agreements. In
the eyes of U.S. law enforcement agencies, it is a powerful way to
expand jurisdiction and patrol efforts in areas known for illicit
trafficking, while at the same time working jointly with other
nations to combat it.
However powerful, implementing a
bilateral agreement from the naval vessel of a third country that
is not party to the agreement must be done judiciously and
overtly to avoid the multitude of problems it has the potential to
create.
B. Reciprocity: Is the United States Willing to
Reciprocate?
The fact that bilateral maritime agreements are reciprocal
agreements is easily overlooked. The discussion of this Comment
has largely concerned itself with how the United States uses
bilateral agreements to enhance U.S. law enforcement power.
However, bilateral maritime agreements also grant foreign
103. See id.
104. See id.
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States the same jurisdictional powers over U.S. vessels on the
high seas. Allowing a Colombian Naval vessel to stop and board
a U.S. commercial or recreational vessel on the high seas and
detain U.S. citizens under the authority of their bilateral
maritime agreement with the U.S. is a frightening prospect for
the Coast Guard as well as U.S. citizens. This fear is not based
solely on the assumption that the Colombian or any other foreign
navy will harass U.S. vessels or citizens, but more on the fact
that a U.S. citizen detained by a foreign navy would be aghast
that the United States had agreed to allow a foreign sovereign to
exercise such authority over them.'
In fact, if the U.S. Coast Guard received a request today
from a Colombian naval vessel to board a U.S. ship under the
U.S.-Colombia bilateral maritime agreement, they would most
likely try to bring a U.S. Coast Guard Cutter on scene prior to
allowing the Colombians to initiate the boarding."6 If this is not
possible, the U.S. Coast Guard may deny Colombia's request to
board." 7 However, it is highly unlikely that Latin American
nations will seek to board U.S. vessels because there is no benefit
is their expending resources to pursue contraband that is
ultimately heading for U.S. shores. To date, these provisions
have rarely been implemented.'
C. Gaps in BilateralCoverage: The Problem of
Geography
If one were to chart the States with which the United States
currently has bilateral maritime agreements with, some notable
gaps in U.S. jurisdictional authority would become immediately
visible. First, the United States has no bilateral counter-drug
agreement with Cuba even though the island of Cuba and its
surrounding twelve nautical mile territorial sea and airspace are
a haven for illicit traffickers. °9 Cuban maritime traffickers can
skirt along inside the territorial sea of Cuba on its west coast up
the Yucatan Channel, or along its east coast in the Old Bahama

105. See U.S. Coast Guard Letter from Commander, Seventh Coast Guard District to
Commandant, 16216, on Counter-Drug Agreement With Columbia (Mar. 13, 1997).
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. See Interview with Lt. Donald Brown, supra note 8.
109. See Bi-lateral Agreement Chart, supra note 7.
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channel without ever exposing themselves to detection or
boarding by U.S. law enforcement interests. The hostility
between the United States and Cuba has aided this trafficking
because Cuba invariably does not allow U.S. law enforcement
assets to patrol its waters.
Secondly, the United States does not have a bilateral
agreement with Mexico."' Similar to Cuba, planes flying air-drop
missions can avoid being intercepted by U.S. law enforcement
assets by staying inside Mexican airspace; maritime traffickers
can do this as well by skirting up inside Mexico's territorial sea
from Central and South America. Thus, Mexico represents
another huge gap in the barrier the United States has tried to
create through bilateral agreements.
D. Immigrant Issues: The Problem of Interdicting
Foreign Nationals on the High Seas
Immigrant smuggling in the Caribbean and Latin America
primarily concerns Cuban, Haitian, and Dominican migrants."'
Interdicting immigrants on the high seas who are suspected of
transiting towards the United States to make an illegal entry can
be legally problematic because such immigrants are technically
not subject to the jurisdictional authority of the United States
until they enter the territorial sea of the United States."'
Therefore, every time the United States interdicts foreign
nationals on the high seas suspected of attempting to illegally
enter the United States, it could be argued that it is violating
international law."'
However, there is often very credible evidence that
immigrants interdicted on the high seas are attempting to
illegally enter the United States."'
Such evidence is often
110. See id.
111. See U.S. Coast Guard, supra note 90.
112. See Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Gracey, 600 F. Supp. 1396, 1400 (D. DC. 1985).
113. The constitutionality and legality of the interdiction of aliens without visas on
the high seas was challenged in an action brought by the Haitian Refugee Center. See id.
The court held that the President possessed constitutional and statutory authority to
establish an at sea interdiction program and that neither the Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees nor the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1967 provided
rights directly enforceable in U.S. courts. See id. at 1406-407.
114. See Note from U.S. Coast Guard Commandant, 16246, on Migrant Interdiction
Policy (Oct. 1998).
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manifested by many means such as the immigrants claimed
intention of going to the United States, the fact that their vessels
are often dangerously overloaded or are not seaworthy, the
possessions that they have with them, or current migration
Additionally, the U.S. Coast Guard often construes
trends.'
these vessels as stateless vessels because they are not flying the
and they
flag of any sovereign State, they have no registration,
6
nationality.1
vessel's
the
to
as
claim
any
make
seldom
However, harder questions of international law arise when
immigrants attempt to illegally enter the United States through
a third country such as the Bahamas, especially when they do so
in small numbers. For example, assume that a small Cuban
fishing boat or Haitian sailboat was located in international
waters, was in a seaworthy condition and not grossly overloaded,
and claimed its next port of call as the Bahamas. In this case,
the United States has no jurisdiction over the vessel or persons
because they are simply foreign nationals on a foreign flagged
vessel transiting from one foreign port to another."' Even if the
United States suspects they are ultimately intending to enter the
United States, it may be prevented from taking any direct
action."' The United States has no authority, notwithstanding
any bilateral or other special agreements with the foreigner's
respective flag-States, until the suspect immigrant vessel
actually enters U.S. territorial seas."9
If the vessel does enter U.S. territorial seas and the
immigrants are interdicted, complex issues of disposition must
then be decided. 2 ' Both U.S. law and international immigration
law prohibit repatriating foreign nationals who can show credible
evidence that they will be subject to persecution on the grounds
115. The U.S. Coast Guard may be justified in removing these people from their
vessels when there is a risk of loss of life at sea due to the condition of their vessel. See
supra note 62.
116. See UNCLOS, supra note 5, art. 92, 21 L.L.M. at 1287.
117. See Note from U.S. Coast Guard Commandant, 16246, on Migrant Interdiction
Policy (Oct. 1998).
118. The United States can only ask the Bahamian Immigration authorities to
investigate the vessel upon its arrival. Or, if the vessel is in Bahamian territorial seas,
the United States can request that the Bahamians take jurisdiction over it. As another
alternative, United States can ask the master of the vessel to 'turnback" (return) to his
country of origin.
119. See supra note 112, and accompanying text.
120. See Note from U.S. Coast Guard Commandant, 16246, on Migrant Interdiction
Policy (Oct. 1998).
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of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
"
group, or political opinion.12
'
Thus, it must be determined
whether the immigrants are fleeing from persecution, in which
case they will not be returned to their home countries, or from
economic hardship, in which case they will be repatriated.
As an additional consideration, Alien Migrant Interdiction
Operation (AMIO) agreements address the U.S. Coast Guard's
authority to interdict vessels suspected of illegally smuggling
foreign immigrants into the United States, and to repatriate
these foreign immigrants."'
Normally, bilateral migrant
agreements are independent of bilateral counter-narcotics
agreements because of the vastly complex issues that arise in
interdicting and repatriating foreign immigrants. However, the
maritime smuggling techniques used for immigrants are
remarkably similar to those used for narcotics.
Ironically, Cuba is the only nation with which the United
States has a standing AMIO agreement.'
The Cuban agreement
essentially allows Cuban immigrants interdicted by the U.S.
Coast Guard on international waters to be directly repatriated to
Cuba, and provides procedures on how to arrange such
repatriations. 24 These repatriations are normally conducted by
placing the Cuban immigrants on a U.S. Coast Guard patrol boat
which then enters the port of Cabanas, Cuba, and turns the
immigrants over to Cuban authorities under the supervision of
the U.S. interest section in Havana.'25 This agreement has been
in place since 1995, and it continues to be exercised almost daily.
U.S. Coast Guard cutters who interdict Cuban immigrants
on the high seas will normally embark Asylum Pre-Screening
Officers (APSOs) from the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization
Service to determine whether immigrants have a credible fear of

121. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a); Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees of 28 July 1951, art. 33, 606 U.N.T.S. 268.
122. See Exec. Order No. 12,807, 57 Fed. Reg. 23,1333 (1992).
123. See Cuba-United States: Joint Statement on the Normalization of Migration,
Building on the Agreement of Sep. 9, 1994, May 2, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 327.
124. See id. Prior to the U.S.-Cuban AMIO agreement, the United States treated all
Cuban immigrants as political refugees and allowed them entry into the United States.
See Douglas Farah, Cuban Officials Stress Difficulty of Adding to Immigration Pact; U.S.
Pressure to Change System Rejected, WASH. POST., May 20, 1995, at A20.
125. See Bob Deans, U.S. Coast GuardSends 13 Cubans Back Home, ATL. J., May 10,
1995, at 4A.
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persecution.1 26 Although APSO interviews are always conducted
with Cuban immigrants, they are not normally conducted with
Haitian, Dominican, or other groups of immigrants unless they
first make a request for asylum.2 7 This is because Haitian and
Dominican immigrants are presumed to be fleeing due to
economic reasons, while Cuban2 8immigrants may be more likely to
be fleeing for political reasons.

The diversity, complexity, and uniqueness of issues that
evolve from interdicting immigrants on the high seas is probably
the primary reason that foreign States have preferred to deal
with these issues on an ad hoc basis, rather then entering into a
bilateral AMIO agreement with the United States.
E. Bad Faith BilateralAgreements and Decertification:The U.S. Practiceof Conditioning
Economic Aid on Entry into BilateralMaritime
Agreements
By March 1 of each year, the President of the United States
must make a decision on whether to certify or sanction the thirty
largest drug producing or transit nations.'29 The President
makes this decision on the basis of the counter-drug efforts made
by these nations. These efforts included evaluating whether drug
production is up or down, whether the country has taken
significant law enforcement action against drug organizations,
and whether the country has taken legislative action to toughen
its domestic laws against drug traffickers.'
The decision on whether to certify or sanction a country
effectively puts the country's entire relationship with the United
States at risk over the singular issue of drugs. A decision to

126. See Note from U.S. Coast Guard Commandant, 16246, on Migrant Interdiction
Policy (Oct. 1998).
127. See id.
128. See Kathie Kiarreich, Lack of a U.S. -HaitiPact on Boat People Clouds Their Fate
on the Seas, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 2, 1995, at 1.

Some commentators have

suggested that this is a false distinction, which actually exists for discriminatory reasons.
This argument is a subject of considerable debate and is beyond the scope of this
Comment.
129. See International Narcotics Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2291h (1999). See also
Coletta Youngers, A Look at Drug Certification: The Process has Become an Annual
Charade, WASH. POST, Mar. 21, 1999, at B3.
130. See id.
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sanction can bring economic harm to the foreign nation that often
falls upon innocent citizens.'
The United States has used the certification process as
leverage to encourage countries to enter into bilateral maritime
agreements. For example, prior to the U.S.-Jamaica bilateral
maritime agreement, the U.S. State Department warned
Jamaica that it was in danger of de-certification for failing to
assist

in

counter-narcotics

efforts. 132

These

bargaining

techniques, coupled with a decrease in aid to the Caribbean
Region, have created a growing resentment towards the United
States.1' 3 Latin American states view the annual certification
process negatively because the United States has also
conditioned domestic legislation on a foreign state obtaining
certification.'
Many states view certification as complete
arrogance on the part of the United States because they perceive
the problem as one of U.S. domestic consumption, and not as one
of foreign production."' Even the bargaining aspect of the
certification process is not always an advantage. In 1996, the
United States decertified Columbia, which caused a slow down in
negotiations on the U.S.-Columbia bilateral counter-drug
agreement negotiations.'
The distaste with which countries view the annual
certification process highlights why some countries feel
compelled into signing bilateral maritime agreements with the
United States. It is essentially a compromise where the foreign
State looses some sovereignty in exchange for limited security
and protection by the United States against illicit traffickers.
Conditioning bilateral agreements on certification may achieve
short-term gains, but it certainly jeopardizes long-term regional
cooperation.

131. See Christopher Marquis & Tim Johnson, Colombia Awaits Decision by U.S. on
Decertification,THE TIMES-PICAYNE, Feb. 16, 1997, at A39.
132. See Bob Ford, U.S.-JamaicaRelations Tense: Some Offended by Efforts to Crack
Down on Drug Trafficking, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 16, 1997, at 26A.
133. See id.
134. See Marquis & Johnson, supra note 131.
135. See Youngers, supra note 129.
136. See Ernesto Pizano Samper, Truth About Columbia Drug FightNot Being Told,
Hous. CHRoN., Feb. 27, 1997, at 35.
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V. THE 21ST CENTURY: IS A MULTILATERAL MARITIME
AGREEMENT POSSIBLE?
As this Comment suggests, one of the difficulties for law
enforcement assets in combating illicit traffickers is coping with
the varying jurisdictional authority throughout the region. In
one sense, bilateral maritime agreements have only exacerbated
this problem because of the differing authorities they provide
from State to State. Nations who have not incorporated all six
parts of the model maritime agreement, as well as the nations
who have thus far refused to enter into bilateral agreements at
137
all, cite sovereignty concerns as their main objection.
Furthermore, some nations resent the fact that the United States
has conditioned receipt of economic aid on their entry into
bilateral agreements, and therefore may have entered into such
agreements as less then fully cooperative partners.
Adopting a multilateral maritime agreement could alleviate
the problems of varying jurisdictional authority, loss of
First, a
sovereignty, and conditional U.S. economic aid.'39
multinational agreement would ideally provide law enforcement
assets with uniform authority throughout the Western
Hemisphere to combat illicit traffickers. Second, sovereignty
would not be a major concern because all nations in the
hemisphere would be giving up an equal amount of sovereignty
in exchange for an equal amount of security. Finally, a
multilateral agreement would remove the ability of the United
States to condition economic aid on submitting to the agreement
because, by its very nature, a multilateral agreement would
dilute the dominating influence of the United States.
On the other hand, a multilateral solution may simply not be
Trying to bring the numerous countries in the
feasible.
hemisphere together and reach an agreement similar to the
This is
model maritime agreement may prove impossible.
because of differing levels of trust between the States. For
example, when it comes to sovereignty, a country may trust the
137. See GRIFFITH, supra note 6, at 219-22.
138. See Bryan, supranote 32, at 45.
139. Thirty-Eighth Strategy for Peace, U.S. Foreign Policy Conference, Building
Multilateral Cooperation in the Americas: A New Direction for U.S. Policy, Oct. 23-25,
1997 (visited Oct. 28, 1998) <http://www.stanleyfdn.org/CONFRPTS/USFP/SPC97/ multi
97.html>.
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Additionally, a
United States more than its neighbor.
minimal
jurisdictional
multilateral agreement may only provide
current
set of
authority and ultimately be less useful then the
bilateral maritime agreements. Some States may refuse to enter
into bilateral maritime agreements unless they are presented
with the reality of losing U.S. economic aid.
VI. CONCLUSION
U.S. law enforcement agencies, especially the U.S. Coast
Guard, have greatly enhanced their already broad jurisdictional
powers through bilateral maritime agreements with Latin
American neighbors. While these agreements are an awesome
grab of jurisdictional power by the United States, they are a
viable alternative to requiring law enforcement assets to respect
territorial boundaries while illicit traffickers treat these
boundaries as being transparent. Moreover, the use of bilateral
maritime agreements furthers the goals of the world community,
as stated in Article 17 of the United Nations Convention Against
Illicit Traffic in Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances. 4 ° More
importantly, these agreements evidence that the nations of the
Western Hemisphere are working together to combat one of the
greatest threats to their security and stability. While bilateral
maritime agreements have not been perfected, and some nations
remain concerned over yielding their sovereignty, they are the
most pragmatic approach yet to combating illicit trafficking.
By continuing to properly exercise bilateral agreements, the
United States can build a record of respect for the sovereignty of
foreign States and thereby encourage more states to enter into
such agreements. More importantly, each State who enters into
a bilateral maritime agreement or who adopts an additional part
of the six-part model maritime agreement, brings the region one
step closer to adopting what is really the ultimate solution-a
regional multilateral maritime agreement to combat illicit
trafficking.
A consensus on a multilateral maritime agreement will be
much easier once trust and experience are established among the
United States and Latin American by working within the
140. See United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances, opened for signature Dec. 20, 1988, U.N. Doc E/CONF.82/15
(1989), 28 I.L.M. 497.
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existing bilateral framework. United States law enforcement
agencies can further this process by judiciously applying the
existing agreements, and ensuring that they continually respect
the sovereignty of regional States. Latin American States have
entrusted the United States with their sovereignty in exchange
This trust must not be abused by
for regional security.
overzealous law enforcement action if we ever expect to build the
current bilateral framework into an effective hemispheric
multilateral maritime agreement.
JOSEPH E. KRAMEK*

* Juris Doctor candidate, May 2000, University of Miami School of Law. The author
would like to thank Professor Bernard Oxman for his guidance and insight with this
article. The opinions contained herein are solely those of the author and are not to be
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VII. APPENDIX
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141. Maritime Counter-drug and AMIO Agreement Chart, U.S. Coast Guard,
COMDT (G-OPL-L), Jan. 12, 1999 update.
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B. U.S. Model MaritimeAgreement"'

AGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA
AND
THE GOVERNMENT OF
CONCERNING COOPERATION TO SUPPRESS ILLICIT
TRAFFIC BY SEA
PREAMBLE
The Government of the United States of America and the
(hereafter, the "parties");
Government of
Bearing in mind the special nature of the problem of illicit
maritime drug traffic;
Having regard to the urgent need for international cooperation in
suppressing illicit maritime drug traffic which is recognized in
the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and its 1972
Protocol in the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances, and
in the 1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (hereinafter, the
"1988 Convention"), and in the 1982 United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea;
Recalling that paragraph 9 of Article 17 of the 1988 Convention
requires the Parties to consider entering into bilateral
agreements to carry out, or enhance the effectiveness of, its
provisions;

142. Email from Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, Office of Law Enforcement,
Washington, D.C., to Joe Kramek (Nov. 5, 1998) (on file with author).
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Desiring to promote greater cooperation between the parties, and
thereby enhance their effectiveness in combating illicit traffic by
sea;
Have agreed as follows:
NATURE AND SCOPE OF AGREEMENT
1. The parties shall cooperate in combating illicit maritime drug
traffic to the fullest extent possible, consistent with available law
enforcement resources and related priorities.
DEFINITIONS
2. In this agreement, unless the context otherwise requires:
a."illicit traffic" has the same meaning as that term is
defined in the 1988 Convention.
b."

territory" means the land [and islands] under
_
the sovereignty of_

c." _

waters" means the territorial sea (insert
archipelagic waters, if applicable) and internal waters of

d.

"_airspace"

the
means
territory and waters.

airspace

over

e. "law enforcement vessels" means warships and other
ships, of the Parties or of third States, aboard which law
enforcement officials are embarked, clearly marked and
identifiable as being on government service and authorized to
that effect, including any embarked boat or aircraft.
f. "law enforcement authority" means: for the Government of
the United States of America, the United States Coast Guard;
, the
and for the Government of
g. "law enforcement officials" means: for the Government of
the United States of America, uniformed members of the United
States Coast Guard; and for the Government of
uniformed members of
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SHIPRIDER PROGRAM AND ENFORCEMENT IN AND
WATERS
OVER
3. Maritime counter-drug operations in

waters are the

responsibility of, and subject to the authority of, the Government
of
4. The parties shall establish a joint law enforcement shiprider
program between their respective law enforcement authorities.
Each Party may designate a coordinator to organize its program
activities and to identify the vessels and officials involved in the
program to the other Party.
5.

may designate

The Government of

qualified law enforcement officials to act as law enforcement
shipriders.

Subject to

law, these shipriders may in

appropriate circumstances:
a. embark on U. S. law enforcement vessels;
b. authorize the pursuit, by the U.S. law enforcement
vessels on which they are embarked, of suspect vessels and
aircraft fleeing into

waters;

c. authorize the U.S. law enforcement vessels on which they
are embarked to conduct counter-drug patrols in

waters;
in

d. enforce the laws of

waters or seaward therefrom in the exercise of the right of hot
pursuit or otherwise in accordance with international law; and
e. authorize the U.S. law enforcement officials to assist in
the enforcement of the laws of

6. The Government of the United States of America may
designate qualified law enforcement officials to act as law
enforcement shipriders. Subject to United States law, these
shipriders may, in appropriate circumstances:
law enforcement vessels;

a. embark on
b.

advise and assist

law enforcement officials in

the conduct of boardings of vessels to enforce the laws of
c.

enforce,

seaward
, the laws

authorized to do so; and

of

the

territorial

sea

of

of the United States where
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law enforcement vessels on

authorize the

which they are embarked to assist in the enforcement of the laws
of the United States seaward of the territorial sea of
7. When a shiprider is embarked on the other Party's vessel, and
the enforcement action being carried out is pursuant to the
shiprider's authority, any search or seizure of property, and
detention of a person, and any use of force pursuant to this
agreement whether or not involving weapons, shall be carried out
by the shiprider except as follows:
a. crew members of the other Party's vessel may assist in
any such action if expressly requested to do so by the shiprider
and only to the extent and in the manner requested. Such
request may only be made, agreed to and acted upon in
accordance with the applicable laws and policies of both parties;
and
b. such crew members may use force in self-defense in
accordance with the applicable laws and policies of their
government.
8. The Government of the United States of America shall not
conduct maritime counter-drug operations in
without the permission of the Government of

waters
_

This agreement
granted by this agreement or otherwise.
of
Government
the
by
permission
constitutes
for United States maritime counter-drug
operations in any of the following circumstances:
shiprider so authorizes;

a. an embarked

b.

a suspect vessel or aircraft, detected seaward of the

waters or
enters
territorial sea of
shiprider is embarked on a U.S.
airspace and no
law
law enforcement vessel in the vicinity, and no

enforcement vessel is immediately available to investigate, the
U.S law enforcement vessel may follow the suspect vessel or
waters in order to investigate, and board

aircraft into

and search the vessel, and, if the evidence warrants, detain the
vessel and the persons on board pending expeditious disposition
instructions from

-

authorities; and
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shiprider is embarked on a U.S. law
c.
no
law
enforcement vessel in the vicinity, and no

enforcement vessel is immediately available to investigate, in
which case the U.S. law enforcement vessel may enter

waters in order to investigate a suspect vessel or aircraft located
therein, and board and search the suspect vessel. If the evidence
warrants, U.S. law enforcement officials may detain the suspect
vessel and persons on board pending disposition instructions
from

9.

authorities.

Nothing in this agreement precludes the Government of

from otherwise expressly authorizing
United States maritime counter-drug operations in .

waters or involving
traffic.
10. The Government of

flag vessels suspected of illicit
shall permit aircraft of the

Government of the United States of America (hereafter, "U.S.
aircraft") when engaged in law enforcement operations or
operations in support of law enforcement agencies to:
a. overfly the territory and waters of

subject to

Article 10 and with due regard for the laws and regulations for
its laws and regulations for the flight and maneuver of aircraft;
and
b. relay, subject to the laws of each Party, orders from the
competent authorities to aircraft suspected of trafficking in
illegal drugs to land in

11. The Government of the United States of America shall, in
the interest of flight safety, observe the following institute
procedures for facilitating flights by U.S. aircraft within
airspace.
a. In the event of planned bilateral or multilateral law
enforcement operations, the U. S. Shall provide reasonable notice
and communications channels to the appropriate
aviation authorities of planned flights by its aircraft over
territory or waters.
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b. In the event of unplanned operations, which may include
airspace pursuant

the pursuit of suspect aircraft into

to this Agreement, the law enforcement and appropriate aviation
authorities of the Parties may exchange information concerning
the appropriate communications channels and other information
pertinent to flight safety.
c. Any aircraft engaged in law enforcement operations or
operations in support of law enforcement activities in accordance
with this Agreement shall comply with such air navigation and
flight safety directions as may be required by the

aviation authorities, and with any written operating procedures
developed by

for flight operations within its airspace

under this Agreement.
OPERATIONS SEAWARD OF THE TERRITORIAL SEA
12. Whenever U. S. law enforcement officials encounter a vessel
flying the

flag or claiming to be registered in
, located seaward of any nation's territorial sea and

have reasonable grounds to suspect that the vessel is engaged in
illicit traffic, this Agreement constitutes the authorization of the
for the boarding and search of
Government of
the suspect vessel and the persons found on board by such
officials. If evidence of illicit traffic is found, United States law
enforcement officials may detain the vessel, persons on board,
evidence and cargo pending expeditious disposition instructions
from the Government of
13. Except as expressly provided herein, this agreement does not
apply to or limit boarding of vessels conducted by either Party in
accordance with international law, seaward of any nation's
territorial sea, whether based, inter alia, on the right of visit, the
rendering of assistance to persons, vessels, and property in
distress or peril, the consent of the vessel master, or an
authorization from the flag state to take law enforcement action.
JURISDICTION OVER DETAINED VESSELS
14.

In all cases arising in

waters or concerning

flag vessels seaward of any nation's territorial sea
shall have the primary right
Government
of
the
detained
vessel and/or persons on
to exercise jurisdiction over a
board (including seizure, forfeiture, arrest, and prosecution),
provided, however, that the Government of
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may, subject to its constitution and laws, waive its primary right

to exercise jurisdiction and authorize the enforcement of United
States law against the vessel and/or persons on board.
IMPLEMENTATION
15. Counter-drug operations pursuant to this agreement shall be
carried out only against vessels and aircraft used for commercial
or private purposes and which either of the Parties has
reasonable grounds suspect are involved in illicit traffic,
including vessels and aircraft without nationality.
16. A Party conducting a boarding and search pursuant to this
agreement shall promptly notify the other Party of the results
thereof. The relevant Party shall timely report to the other
Party, consistent with its laws, on the status of all investigations,
prosecutions and judicial proceedings resulting from enforcement
action taken pursuant to this agreement where evidence of illicit
traffic was found.
17. Each Party shall ensure that its law enforcement officials,
when conducting boardings and searches pursuant to this
agreement act in accordance with the applicable national laws
and policies of that Party and with international law and
accepted international practices.
18. Boardings and searches pursuant to this agreement shall be
carried out by law enforcement officials from law enforcement
vessels. The boarding and search team may carry standard law
enforcement small arms.
19. All use of force by a Party pursuant to this agreement shall
be in strict accordance with applicable laws and policies of the
respective Party and shall in all cases be the minimum
reasonably necessary under the circumstances. Nothing in this
agreement shall impair the exercise of the inherent right of selfdefense by law enforcement or other officials of either Party.
20. To facilitate implementation of this agreement, each Party
shall ensure the other Party is fully informed concerning its
applicable laws and policies, particularly those pertaining to the
use of force. Each Party has the corresponding responsibility to
ensure that all of its officials engaging in law enforcement
operations pursuant to this agreement are knowledgeable
concerning the applicable laws and policies of both parties.
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21. Unless their status is specifically provided for in another
agreement, all law enforcement and other officials of the
Government of the United States of America present in
waters or territory or on
vessels in connection with this

agreement shall be accorded the privileges and immunities
equivalent to those of the administrative and technical staff of a
diplomatic mission under the 1961 Vienna Convention on
diplomatic relations.
22. Assets seized in consequence of any operation undertaken in
waters pursuant to this agreement shall be disposed of
in accordance with the laws of
. Assets seized
_

in consequence of any operation undertaken seaward of the
territorial sea of

pursuant to this agreement

shall be disposed of in accordance with the laws of the seizing
Party. To the extent permitted by its laws and upon such terms
as it deems appropriate, a Party may, in any case, transfer
forfeited assets or proceeds of their sale to the other Party.
23. In case a question arises in connection with implementation
of this agreement, either Party may request consultations to
resolve the matter. If any loss or injury is suffered as a result of
any action taken by the law enforcement or other officials of one
Party in contravention of this agreement or any improper or
unreasonable action is taken by a Party pursuant thereto, the
parties shall, without prejudice to any other legal rights which
may be available, consult at the request of either Party to resolve
the matter and decide any questions relating to compensation.
24.
Except as provided in paragraph 21, nothing in this
agreement is intended to alter the rights and privileges due any
individual in any legal proceeding.
25. Situations not provided for by this agreement will be
determined in accordance with international law.
26. Nothing in this agreement shall prejudice the position of
either Party with regard to the international law of the sea.
ENTRY INTO FORCE AND DURATION
27. This agreement shall enter into force upon signature by both
parties.
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28. This agreement may be terminated at any time by either
Party upon written notification to the other Party through the
diplomatic channel, such termination to take effect one year from
the date of notification.
29. This agreement shall continue to apply after termination
with respect to any administrative or judicial proceedings arising
out of actions taken pursuant to this agreement.
In witness whereof, the undersigned, being duly authorized by
their respective governments, have signed this agreement.
Done at
English and

-

of 199, in the
day of
_, this __
languages, each text being duly authentic.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF
THE UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF

2000]

BILATERAL MARITIME AGREEMENTS

161

USCG RECIPROCAL SHIPBOARDING PROPOSAL
Request interagency (DOD, DOS, DOJ) clearance on below
language for use in US-NI bilateral maritime counterdrug
agreement. Request clearances by COB3/20.
Whenever law enforcement officials of one Party (the "first
Party") encounter a vessel flying the flag or claiming to be
registered in the other Party, located seaward of any nation's
territorial sea and suspected of illicit traffic, the law enforcement
officials of the first Party may board and search the suspect
vessel and the persons found on board. Prior to conducting the
boarding and search, the law enforcement authority of the first
Party shall notify the law enforcement authority of the other
Party by the most expeditious means of its intent to board and
search. Except where it would interfere with ongoing law
enforcement operations, the other Party shall not object to the
boarding and search by the first Party. If evidence of illicit
traffic is found, the law enforcement officials of the first Party
may detain the vessel and persons on board pending expeditious
disposition instructions from the other Party.

